Improving users' isolation in IaaS: Virtual Machine Placement with Security Constraints by Caron, Eddy & Rouzaud-Cornabas, Jonathan
Improving users’ isolation in IaaS: Virtual Machine
Placement with Security Constraints
Eddy Caron, Jonathan Rouzaud-Cornabas
To cite this version:
Eddy Caron, Jonathan Rouzaud-Cornabas. Improving users’ isolation in IaaS: Virtual Ma-
chine Placement with Security Constraints. [Research Report] RR-8444, INRIA. 2014. <hal-
00924296>
HAL Id: hal-00924296
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00924296
Submitted on 10 Jan 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
IS
S
N
0
2
4
9
-6
3
9
9
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
--
8
4
4
4
--
F
R
+
E
N
G
RESEARCH
REPORT
N° 8444
December 2013
Project-Team Avalon
Améliorer l’isolation des
utilisateurs sur les IaaS:
Placement de Machine
Virtuelle avec contrainte
de sécurité
Eddy Caron, Jonathan Rouzaud-Cornabas

RESEARCH CENTRE
GRENOBLE – RHÔNE-ALPES
Inovallée
655 avenue de l’Europe Montbonnot
38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
Ame´liorer l’isolation des utilisateurs sur les
IaaS: Placement de Machine Virtuelle avec
contrainte de se´curite´
Eddy Caron∗†, Jonathan Rouzaud-Cornabas†
Project-Team Avalon
Research Report n° 8444 — December 2013 — 16 pages
Abstract: Nowadays virtualization is used as the sole mechanism to isolate different users
on Cloud platforms. We will show that due to improper virtualization of micro-architectural
components, data leak and modification can occur on public Clouds. Furthermore, using the same
vector, it is possible to induce performance interferences, i.e. noisy neighbors. Using this approach,
a VM can slow down and steal resources from concurrent VMs. We propose placement heuristics
that take into account isolation requirements. We modify three classical heuristics to take into
account these requirements. Furthermore, we propose four new heuristics that take into account
the hierarchy of the Cloud platforms and the isolation requirements. Finally, we evaluate these
heuristics and compare them with the modified classical ones. We show that our heuristics are
performing at least as good as classical ones but are scaling better and are faster by a few order
of magnitude than the classical ones.
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Improving users’ isolation in IaaS:
Virtual Machine Placement with Security Constraints
Re´sume´ : De nos jours, la virtualisation est utilise´e comme le me´canisme unique pour isoler diffe´rents
utilisateurs sur les plateformes de Cloud. Nous allons montre´ qu’a` cause d’une virtualisation incomple´te
des composants micro-architecturaux, des fuites et des modifications de donne´es ont lieu sur les Clouds
public. De plus, en utilisant le meˆme vecteur, il est possible d’interfe´rer sur les performances. En utilisant
cette approche, une machine virtuelle peut ralentir et voler les ressources d’une autre. Nous proposons des
heuristiques de placement qui prennent en compte des besoins d’isolation. Nous modifions 3 heuristiques
classique pour prendre en compte ces besoins. De plus, nous proposons 4 nouveaux heuristiques qui
prennent en compte la hie´rachie des plateformes de Cloud et les besoins d’isolation. Finallement, nous
e´valuons ces heuristiques et les comparons avec les heuristiques classiques. Nous montrons que nos
heuristiques sont au moins aussi performant que les classiques mais qu’ils passent mieux a` l’e´chelle et
sont plus rapide par plusieurs ordres de grandeurs.
Mots-cle´s : Cloud, IaaS, Securite´, Isolation, Contrainte, Heuristics
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Virtualization is now widely used in modern data centers. Thank to mature software stacks and the
widespread availability of platforms all over the world, the Cloud is now available for many applications
of different kinds. Security and performance are the main goal users want to achieve when porting
applications over IaaS or PaaS platforms. Security has been proven to be sometimes difficult to obtain [1]
and several issues have been raised in public Clouds and public domain virtualization software stacks.
Several different kinds of attacks and security issues can be observed that may lower the impact of Clouds.
On the performance side, the expectations are higher than what can be actually obtained on today’s
public Clouds. Shared Physical Machines lead to performance degradation that are not appropriate
for high performance applications. Isolation is then a critical issue both for security and performance
concerns.
In this paper, we present the limitation of using virtualization technology as the sole approach to
isolate workloads and users within a Cloud. In highly secured environments, strong isolation is done by
unshared resources environment for two tasks with different security clearance. It is still the strongest
defense against covert-channels (and other attacks). But this approach eliminates most of the current
public and private Clouds but also the way how virtualization is used. With the widespread usage of
virtualization, the need of strong isolation in such environment becomes critical.
First, in Section 2, we present the micro-architecture of modern computer. We also present the
virtualization limitations and how they can be exploited to attack security and privacy in the Clouds.
Moreover, we show that the same issue exists for performance. In Section 3, we introduce a set of VM
placement heuristics that take into account the security requirements. Furthermore, we propose a set of
optimization for these heuristics to improve performance and consolidation. In the Section 4, we present
our evaluation methodology and explain our results. Finally, in the Section 5, we conclude and present
our future work.
2 Micro-Architecture: Where Virtualization Failed
Since the last few years, the complexity of physical machines’ hardware topology has increased dra-
matically [2]. The number of cores, shared caches, and memory nodes have completely changed the
micro-architecture of computers. From a simple CPU architecture during the Pentium era, we have now
access to complex multi-core, multi-level caches that can be specific to a core, shared between some or
all. Symmetric Multithreaded Processors (SMP) brings another level of hierarchy. SMP is a mean to
share the resources of a core between multiple logical processors.
With the increasing number of cores, scalability becomes a major issue. To address it, modern
processors use non-uniform interconnects1. This technology is named a Non-Uniform Memory Access
(NUMA) architecture. But memory is not the only resources to be accessed through these non-uniform
interconnects, Input/Ouput Devices accesses are done in a similar manner (Non-Uniform Input/Output
Access – NUIOA). In this type of architecture, some cores have faster access than others to some I/O
devices and memory banks [3]. For example, Figure 1 shows the inner architectural components of five
modern platforms. As one can see, depending on whether the data is stored in a directly connected
memory bank or in a remote one, the access to it will need to passthrough one (or more) CPU. The
same is true for the I/O devices. Accordingly, the placement of tasks on CPU and their related data on
memory banks is critical to exploit performance on these modern architecture.
The inner-topology of computer has a large impact on performance depending where the different
process of an application are placed. For example, the DMA throughput can decrease by up to 42%
when accessing a GPU from a distant NUMA node. Thus, exporting the topology to the VM is critical.
Virtualized NUMA (vNUMA) is already available [4]. But there is not a one-to-one mapping between
virtual and physical NUMA. Indeed, some physical NUMA can be shared through two vNUMA by VMs
and two NUMA can be aggregated into one vNUMA. Accordingly, performance optimization can be
buried by the vNUMA not really providing the same kind of hardware connections it exposes.
1HyperTransport for AMD and QPI for Intel.
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Figure 1: Interconnection of processors (P), memory (M) and I/O chipsets in some modern architec-
tures [3]: (a) four AMD Istanbul processors; (b) four AMD Magny-Cours processors; (c) and (d) two
Intel Westmere-EP processors; (e) four Intel Nehalem-EX processors.
2.1 Covert-Channel
Contrary to the memory and CPU, the micro-architectural component are not properly virtualized
in modern platform. Therefore, the sharing of micro-architectural components can be used as covert
channels to leak information between concurrent VMs. In [5], authors present new work on the creation
of covert channels of communication between virtual machines through the L2 cache processors. Their
goal is to quantify the rate of leakage through this channel. In previous work [1], three channels were
studied: memory (0.006bps), disk (0.0005bps), and L2 cache (0.2bps). The purpose of [5] is to see if
they can optimize the speed. In experimental testbeds, they were able to reach a rate of 223.71bps and
between 1.27bps and 10.46bps on Amazon EC2. Other studies of covert channels within Clouds have
been made in [6, 7].
In [8], authors present a new inter-vms attack in the Cloud. Unlike previous works, they do not
use the L2 cache CPU but the memory bus. This new channel allows them not to be limited to a set
of cores sharing a cache but they can reach the entire physical machine. To do this, they observe the
memory bus contention as covert channel. They are able to create a covert channel with a bandwidth of
746.8 bps (+/- 10.1) and between 343.5 bps (+/- 66.1) and 107.9 bps (+/- 39.9) on Amazon EC2. This
improvement is at least a factor of 10 with approaches via the L2 cache.
2.2 Noisy Neighbors: Performance Interference
Virtualization is also used in Cloud Computing to provide performance isolation between multiple ten-
ants. With a perfect performance isolation, no performance interference between two VMs must exist.
Thus, noisy VM will have no impact on the performance of other VMs. Hypervisors implement resources
Inria
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on CPU time and memory capacity and do not take into account other resources [9]. Furthermore,
current hardware virtualization does not provide mechanisms to limit micro-architectural components
usage.
With the lack of strong isolation and in particular on micro-architectural components, the perfor-
mance of a VM can suffer from interference coming from another one running on the same hardware.
In [10], authors show that the performance loss can be up to 80% on a cache-sensitive benchmark because
of the behavior of a collocated VM. But others works have shown the same type of performance loss can
be achieved by attacking shared memory [11] and [12]. Other works have studied the strong performance
interference in Cloud Computing platforms [13, 14, 15]. As one can expect, all the shared resources
(compute, storage and network) in Clouds are affected by interference issues.
The effectiveness of such interference could lead to a new class of attacks called Resource-Freeing
Attacks (RFA) in [10]. “A resource-freeing attack leverages these observations of contention to improve
a VM’s performance by forcing a competing VM to saturate some bottleneck resources”. The purpose of
such attack would be to create interference that leads a VM to starve due to its inability to access specific
micro-architectural components and thus freeing other resources. Accordingly, the VM that launches the
attack could used these resources to boost its performance. Authors of [10] have shown they can gain a
performance boost of up to 60% in lab and 13% on Amazon EC2.
2.3 Detection of Covert-Channel
Amazon provides a service that dedicates physical machines to an user: dedicated instances. But this
service comes with a high price. [7] propose to continuously monitor memory access latencies and
generates alarms when anomalies are detected. But memory probing incurs high performance overhead.
Moreover, their approach has a high false positive rate.
valid [16] is a specific language for security assurance. The goal is to verify the respect of security
properties i.e. to detect violations of them. The language can express security goals such as isolation
and generally express security properties based on information flow. Their approach is limited to detect
isolation faults in network and is not able to do it for micro-architectures.
2.4 Improving Isolation within a Physical Machine
As we have presented in Section 2.1, it is possible to create covert channels between VMs by using the
lack of proper virtualization of micro-architectural components.
In [17], authors propose to improve the isolation of virtual machines while minimizing the loss of
consolidation. The approach consists in offering better refinement within this isolation. They propose
two algorithms: cache hierarchy aware core assignment and page coloring based cache partitioning. It
limits the risk of breaking the isolation between virtual machines without having to use multiple physical
machines. But their approach introduces a very large overhead that renders it inapplicable on real world
Cloud platforms.
In [18], authors propose a protection that allows the hypervisor to counter attacks on cpu caches.
Their approach has an overhead equivalent to 3 % loss of memory and cache. In addition, it brings an
overhead of 5.9 to 7.2 % in terms of computation. Other works around software mechanisms to increase
performance isolation exist for other resources: disk [19], memory bandwidth [20], and network [21].
The NoHype concept [22, 23] consists in removing the virtualization layer while retaining the key
features enabled by virtualization. They limit covert-channel by enabling one VM per core but as we
have show, other covert-channels exist within the micro-architecture components. Moreover, they are
not able to do fair sharing on I/O and memory bus. Thus the performance isolation between VMs with
NoHype remains weak.
2.5 Discussions
As we have shown in this section, the micro-architecture of modern platforms is evolving very fast. From
a single CPU processor few years ago, we have now access to massively parallel platforms with complex
hierarchy of micro-architectural components.
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security and performance isolation between users and their VMs. But the lack of proper isolation of
micro-architectural components lead to the ability of creating covert-channels between these VMs. It
has been shown that it is possible to use these covert-channels to extract sensitive information such as
cryptographic keys. But the security isolation is only one fold of a two folds issue. Performance isolation
is also critical for Clouds. Indeed, if a VM is not able to efficiently use its available resources due to a
noisy neighbor, it can lead to availability issue. As we have shown, a VM can applied such noisy neighbor
behavior to slowdown a collocated VM. That leads the collocated VM to release resources and the VM
who launches the attacks is able to extract more performance from the Cloud.
Motivation As we have shown depending of the micro-architectural components shared between VMs,
it is more or less effective to create covert-channels. The same is true for performance isolation. The
sharing (or not) of micro-architectural components brings to complex security and performance trade-
offs. Providing the tenant with the ability to specify the level of sharing his VMs can accept for micro-
architectural components but also for higher level resources such as clusters would give him the ability to
configure the quality of isolation for each of his VMs. In the rest of the paper, we propose an approach
to provide adaptable isolation. We show how it can be ported to any resource management system at
node level (hypervisor) and at Cloud level.
3 Resource Allocation with Security Requirements
To help guide the placement of virtual machines, the main approach is to use constraints which reflect the
goals expressed by the user and the entity that operates the infrastructure. By expressing the placement
problem as Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP), it is possible to use a solver to resolve it. Constraints
can represent different goals such as energy saving [24]. But solving large problems is time consuming
thus using a decentralized and hierarchical approach can decrease the computation of a solution [25, 26].
The principle of using a linear program or a linear system to solve the problem of placement of virtual
machines in the Cloud with constraints has been studied numerous times as in [27, 28]. The constraints
can modelize numerous goals such as performance and availability [29]. These goals are then translate
into collocation and anti-collocation constraints. As for the CSP approach, linear program approaches
do not scale. To improve the performance of VM placement algorithm, hierarchical representation allows
to reduce the search space [29]. Avoiding cache and processor resource contention through scheduling
algorithms is a well studied approach [30, 31, 32]. At the cluster level, numerous works have also been
done [33, 34]. The purpose of these approaches is to increase performance isolation between processes.
The current issue is to have efficient and scalable algorithms that are able to work at the scale of
multi-datacenters Cloud infrastructure. CSP or linear program approaches do not scale well. Indeed,
placing VMs on Clouds can be formalized as a multi-dimensional bin-packing. Therefore, the complexity
of solving such problem is NP-Complete. Heuristics allow to have almost optimal solutions with a
reduced complexity. In this paper, we propose to use such heuristics. They are able to take into
account isolation requirements while placing VMs on a multi-datacenter Clouds or any hierarchical and
distributed large scale infrastructure. Such infrastructure can be seen as a tree where a specific depth
represents a hierarchical level, e.g. datacenter, cluster, rack, pm, socket, NUMA, core. Each node of
the tree represents a resource at one level of the infrastructure. Except for the root nodes, each node is
linked to a father node representing the resource above it, e.g. a core is linked to a NUMA. Moreover,
except nodes representing cores, all nodes have at least one child node that represents the resources
below them, e.g. a NUMA is linked to a set of cores.
3.1 User Isolation Requirement
The purpose of the user isolation requirement is to enforce isolation between users. The requirement has
a scope where it applies i.e. a level in the hierarchy of the distributed infrastructure. For example, if
the requirement’s scope is pm, it will apply to all the level below the pm e.g. numa and socket and at
the pm level. We differentiate 3 types of isolation requirement: alone, friends and enemies. With alone
requirement, the user specifies that only his VMs can shared the resources at a given level (and all the
Inria
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with ennemies, the user specifies a list of users that must never share resources with him.
To verify these requirements, we use two functions. The first one checks if a node and the VMs
already allocated on it respects the user’s requirements. Furthermore, the functions also verifies if all
the nodes above the checked node also verifies the user’s requirements. The second one verifies if a new
VM respects the user’s requirements of all VMs already allocated on a given pm.
3.2 Heuristics
In this section, we will first present two optimizations than can be used by all VM placement heuristics.
Then, we present heuristics that do not take into account the hierarchy. Finally, we present 4 first fit
and best fit heuristics that take into account the hierarchy.
3.2.1 Optimizations
A function, Check Capacity, is used by the heuristics to verify that a node of the distributed system has
enough resources for a vm. To avoid to search in a branch of the hierarchy if no node within it contains
enough resources to start a VM, we introduce the optimization betterF it. Indeed, a level in the hierarchy
can have enough free aggregated resources of a specific capacity but these resources are shared between
pms. For example, a cluster can have 20 free cpu cores but with only a maximal block of 4 available on
a pm. Thus, without betterF it, the algorithm will try to find a pm that can host the VM that requests
8 cpu cores but will failed as none contains enough resources. With betterF it, the algorithm will know
that there is no block of cpu cores larger than 4 and thus it can avoid to iterate through all the pms of
the cluster. Therefore, betterF it avoids to search in branch where there is no solution.
Except for the FirstFit heuristics, all the VM placement heuristics presented here return a list of pms.
Thus, we need to sort this list to select the pm that is the best to start the VM. All the pms returned
by the VM placement heuristics fit the capacity and isolation requirements, the sorting algorithm does
not change anything about it. But the sorting algorithm helps to improve the quality of placement by
selecting the best fitting pms in a list of fitting pms. Moreover, the same heuristic can be used to sort all
the nodes in the hierarchy and not only the pms. Indeed, in some heuristics, we need to sort a list of nodes
at other level within the hierarchy e.g. clusters. We use two different sorting heuristics. sortBestF it
applies best fit i.e. it places at the beginning of the list the nodes that have just enough resources for
the VM. It helps to improve the consolidation of the nodes while respecting the resources and isolation
requirements. sortBestF itAppsAffinity is a more advanced version that takes into account already
placed VMs. In addition of best fit, it puts at the beginning of the list the nodes where VMs from the
same application are already running. Then the nodes that has a father, i.e. a node at a higher level in
the hierarchy, where VMs from the same application are running. And recursively, it does so for every
upper levels. For example, it will put at first two pms where VMs from the same application are already
running and will sort one from the other one by applying the best fit heuristic. Then, it will put the pms
that belong to a cluster where VMs from the same application are running and applies best fit heuristic
between them. Therefore, it helps to consolidate the application by placing the VMs belonging to an
application close to another. Thus, it helps to minimize the latency between VMs of an application.
Moreover, by grouping the VMs of an application on a sub-part of the hierarchy, it helps to improve the
number of allocated VMs by avoiding to spread an application in the hierarchy. Indeed, if an application
is spread in the distributed system and required an isolation requirement with a scope at the upper level
of the hierarchy, it can lock a large part of the distributed system for one application.
3.2.2 Heuristics not Hierarchy-Aware
In this paper, we present new heuristics that take into account the hierarchy of distributed systems such
as cloud. But, we want to compare our heuristics with ones that do not take into account hierarchy.
Even if they do not take into account the hierarchy, they respect the capacity and isolation requirements.
The FirstF it heuristic takes the list of all the pms on the distributed system. It iterates trough it until it
finds a node that fits the capacity and isolation requirements. The issue with FirstF it is that it always
iterates on a fixed list of pms. To improve it, FirstF itShuffle does a shuﬄe on the list of pms before
iterating on it. The BestF it heuristic takes the list of all the pms on the distributed systems. It returns
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presented previously.
3.2.3 BestFit
HierarchicalAwareBestF it (HABF) takes into account the hierarchy. It applies one of the two sorting
algorithms at each level of the hierarchy. First, it sorts using one of the two sorting algorithms all the
root of the distributed systems and selects the best fitting one. Then it does the same with each child
of the best fit node. Recursively, it reaches a subset of pms, e.g. the pms belonging to a cluster that fits
the capacity and isolation requirements and returns this list. The list can be then sorted using one of
the two sorting algorithms. All the best fit hierarchy-aware heuristics presented here including this one
are based on a Breath First Search algorithm.
3.2.4 BestFit with Properties
Contrary to the previous one, HierarchicalAwareBestF itwProperties (HABFP) starts to use best fit
only when it reaches a level in the hierarchy that is equal to the higher level expressed by the isolation
requirements. Thus, it will iterate through all the branches of the tree at the beginning. By doing so,
the heuristic is able to choose the best fit node at a specific level in the hierarchy and is not limited to
the children of the best fit node of each level. Unless the higher level expressed by isolation requirements
is the higher level of the hierarchy, the heuristic will iterate through more nodes but it can find a best fit
nodes that is behind a non best fit nodes. For example, an application specifies an isolation requirements
at the cluster level. If using the first version of the best fit hierarchy-aware heuristic, it will select a cluster
in best fit site. With this heuristic, it will iterate through all the sites and all the clusters belonging to
each site. It will then select the best fit cluster.
3.2.5 BestFit Large
As we previously state, a best fit node can be behind a not best fit node at a upper level in the
hierarchy. Thus, doing best fit at each level of the hierarchy can have bad effects by hiding some
nodes. HierarchicalAwareBestF itLarge (HABFL) still applies a best fit hierarchy-aware heuristic but
it iterates through all the valid nodes at each level. It will not iterate through part of the system that is
not fitting capacity and isolation requirements. Thus, contrary to the non hierarchical-aware heuristics
as presented in the Section 3.2.2, it does not have to iterate through all the pms.
3.2.6 BestFit Large with Hierarchical Sorting
HierarchicalAwareBestF itLargeSort (HABFLS) is a variant of HierarchicalAwareBestF itLarge.
HierarchicalAwareBestF itLargeSort returns an already sorted list but this list is sorted differently
than HABFL. The list is hierarchically sorted such as the first pm on the list are the ones that are the
best fitting pms with the best fitting ancestors. For example, first will be the sorted list of pms of the
best fitting cluster of the best fitting site. Then the best fitting node of the second best fitting cluster of
the best fitting site, etc..
3.2.7 Summary
We summarize the different heuristics in the table 3.2.7. The complexity is the worst case for finding (or
not) a fitting node for a given VM, i.e. browsing all the nodes of the platform. For the heuristic com-
plexity (without optimizations), we use the following formalism. A platform is composed of i hierarchical
levels, with 1 the lower one, i.e. pm and i the higher one, e.g. datacenter. At each level, the maximal
number of nodes attached to a node of higher level is MNi. Accordingly, the maximal number of nodes
Ni at a level i is Ni = MNi×Ni−1. The global number of nodes at any levels is N = ∀i,MNi×Ni−1. For
the sake of simplicity, we use NPM to express the number of pms. Accordingly, NPM = MNO ×N1.
For example, to model the EC2 platform 2, we use 5 hierarchical levels (region, zone, cluster, rack, PM)
with MNi respectively equals to 7, 3, 5, 4 and 96. In this case, NPM = 40320. As one can see in the
table 3.2.7, the theoretical complexity of hierarchy-aware heuristics is a little bit higher than the classical
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
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Name Aware EC2
FF FirstFit ✗ NPM 40320
FFS FirstFitShuﬄe ✗ NPM 40320
BF BestFit ✗ NPM 40320
HABF HierarchicalAwareBestFit ✓ N 40873
HABFP HierarchicalAwareBestFitwProperties ✓ N 40873
HABFL HierarchicalAwareBestFitLarge ✓ N 40873
HABFLS HierarchicalAwareBestFitLargeSort ✓ N 40873
Table 1: Summary of the different heuristics and their complexity
ones, i.e. an increasing of complexity of 1.4%. But, we will show in the Section 4 that in practice, the
hierarchical-aware heuristics are few orders of magnitude faster than classical ones.
3.2.8 Inside a Physical Machine
For the moment, the heuristic to select resources inside a pm is limited to select specific cpu core. It
can be extended for memory and other resources such as i/o devices. To select a set of cores inside the
selected pm, we use the HierarchicalAwareBestF itwProperties heuristic.
4 Experimentation
In this section, we will first present how we generate simulation scenario then how our simulation scenario
are run. Then, we present our simulation results that compare the different heuristics we introduced in
the previous section.
4.1 Scenario
In this section, we describe how we have generate our scenario. These scenario must be plausible with
a bit of randomness. The users join and leave the platform based on some basic market rules. At the
beginning, the platform has a few early adopters. Then, it gains momentum with an ever increasing
number of users joining the platform. Finally, it has reach its limit of attractiveness and few new users
are joining it. Accordingly, we approximate the number of users on the infrastructure using a poisson
distribution. Furthermore, we use two types of models to simulate the elasticity of applications. The
first one is called Uniform, it adds and removes VM(s) at each new application step of the simulation
e.g. every hours by picking an amount to add/delete randomly. The second one is called amr, it uses
the elasticity model introduced in [35].
We limit our experimentation to applications with only one isolation requirement. It is not a limitation
of our algorithms but it is a good first evaluation of them. Indeed, we want to know the impact of
isolation requirements on consolidation and on placement time thus combining different requirements
will complexify the task. For each application, we randomly select an isolation type (and the related list
of friends or ennemies users if needed) and a level at which it applies in the infrastructure.
On top of the isolation requirement, we randomly select the different parameter of an application
(elasticity model, number of VMs at the beginning, isolation requirements). Then, we just need to launch
the application i.e. schedule the VMs required at the beginning and launch the elasticity function. It
runs continuously and based on the elastic model used, adds or removes VMs.
4.2 Results
We have generate 5 scenarios: an average of 3, 30 and 300 new users per day on a Cloud using the
Grid’5000 platform 3 and an average of 3 and 30 new users per day on a Cloud using the EC2 platform.
3http://www.grid5000.fr
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Figure 2: Memory consolidation per Host
We run the 5 scenarios with each of the 7 placement heuristics and the two optimizations BetterFit
(BF) and AppsAffinity (AF). NOBF and NOAF respectively indicat that we do not use BF and AF
optimizations.
4.2.1 Consolidation
We have compute four indicators for the consolidation: average cpu consolidation, average cpu con-
solidation per pm, average memory consolidation and average memory consolidation per pm. For this
metric, the higher is the better. They are computed by taking into account the pms where vms are
placed. We compute the ratio of the amount of resources used against the total amount of resources on
all the pms for average cpu and memory consolidation. We do the same per pm and compute an average
for average cpu and memory consolidation per pm. For reasons of space in this paper, we only display
the global memory consolidation in the Figure 2 but the others are showing the same trend. As one can
see, the impact of BF and AF optimizations is low especially for hierarchical heuristics. The same is
true for all the other metrics. Accordingly, in the following figures, we will not show the value for each
combination of optimizations but just the median of all combinations and the error bar.
As shown in the Figure 2, on the Grid’5000 platform, our hierarchical heuristics perform as good
as classical one. Except for the case where 300 new users arrived each day, in this case, the classical
BestFit heuristic is not able to run fast enough and the experimentation failed. On the EC2 platform,
our hierarchical heuristics perform a lot better than the classical one. Indeed, they are able to take into
account the hierarchy of the platform and improve the overall consolidation. Whereas, classical ones
only see the platform as a long list of pms. Accordingly, our heuristics scale better than classical ones on
large scale and hierarchical platforms. Futhermore, all our hierarchical heuristics perform equally from
a consolidation point of view.
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Figure 3: VM successfully added for each scenario
4.2.2 Successfully added VMs
This metric highlights the number of VMs that have been successfully placed by each heuristics. For this
metric, the higher is the better. As shown on the Figure 3, our heuristics perform a little bit better, on
average, than classical one on the Grid’5000 platform. But on the EC2 platform, they are performing at
least 2 times better than the classical ones. Indeed, our heuristics permit to place between 2 and 4 times
more VMs on the same platform than the classical ones. This is strongly link with the consolidation
metrics as placing more VMs on a platform required to improve the consolidation.
4.2.3 VM placement duration
In this section, we study the impact of the different heuristics on the time taken to place a VM. For this
metric, the lower is the better. The duration on the Figure 4 is displayed in nanoseconds. Except for the
first experiment (3 users per day on the Grid’5000 platform), the value for the classical BestFit heuristic is
not displayed because it is at least 100 times higher than the worst performing one and renders the figure
unreadable. Contrary to the consolidation and successfully added VMs metrics, our hierarchical heuristics
perform better even on the Grid’5000 platform. For example on the fifth experiment, our heuristics
perform between 1,000 and 10,000 faster than the two classical FirstFit heuristics. Consequently, our
heuristics are able to have at least the same consolidation and successfully added VMs than classical ones
and being faster by at least two orders of magnitude. Finally, one can see than HABFP and HABFLS
are slower than the two other ones. This is due to a larger space search in average. Indeed as previously
explained, these two heuristics start to cut branch in the search space later than the two other.
4.2.4 Impact of requirements on placement duration
This section concludes the study of our experimentation. Here, we take a look on the impact of isolation
requirements on the placement duration. We only study it for our heuristics as the other ones does not
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Figure 4: Average duration of placing a new VM
intrinsically take into account the isolation requirements. Futhermore, for a reason of space, we only
show the results for a small subset of possible isolation requirements and for only one experiment (EC2
with 30 new users per day). We wanted to know if requiring a low (core) or high (datacenter) level
of isolation or a different type of isolation (alone, friend, enemy) will have impact on the placement
duration. As one can see on the Figure 5, the type of isolation is not strongly related to the placement
duration. On the contrary, the level of isolation has an impact on the placement duration. The lower
the level of isolation is the slower the placement duration time is. Indeed, with a high level of isolation,
the heuristics are able to reduce the search space earlier than for the requirements that require low level
of isolation. Finally, as in the previous section, HAFP and HABFLS are slower than the two other ones.
5 Conclusion
We have seen that a large range of possible and real-world attacks on Cloud platforms are due to improper
isolation. We have shown that the existing method to improve isolation (from a data and performance
points of view) are limited to only detecting them or induce a large overhead. Accordingly, we propose
to enhance VM placement heuristics with isolation requirements.
We have introduce the concept of user’s isolation requirements for hierarchical and distributed large
scale platform. Then, we have explained how these requirements can be used inside VM placement
heuristics. Furthermore, we have introduce 4 new heuristics that use the hierarchical nature of the
platform.
From experiments, we show that our heuristics perform at least as good as classical ones. Furthermore,
on large-scale platforms such as EC2, our heuristics are performing few orders of magnitude better than
the classical ones. Finally, we highlight the correlation between VM placement duration and the level of
isolation required by a VM.
In the future, we will work on an application model with a larger scale of security requirements [36].
We plan to extend our heuristics to support the whole scope of the requirements and applications
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Figure 5: Average duration of placing a new VM with different level and type of isolation
expressed through it. Finally, we will extend our heuristics to allocate network resources as well.
References
[1] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring
Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, ser. CCS ’09. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp.
199–212. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1653662.1653687
[2] F. Broquedis, J. Clet-Ortega, S. Moreaud, N. Furmento, B. Goglin, G. Mercier, S. Thibault, and
R. Namyst, “hwloc: A Generic Framework for Managing Hardware Affinities in HPC Applications,”
in Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP), 2010 18th Euromicro International
Conference on, feb. 2010, pp. 180 –186.
[3] B. Goglin and S. Moreaud, “Dodging Non-Uniform I/O Access in Hierarchical Collective
Operations for Multicore Clusters,” in CASS 2011: The 1st Workshop on Communication
Architecture for Scalable Systems, held in conjunction with IPDPS 2011. Anchorage, AK: IEEE
Computer Society Press, May 2011. [Online]. Available: http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00566246
[4] Q. Ali, V. Kiriansky, J. Simons, and P. Zaroo, “Performance Evaluation of HPC Benchmarks on
VMware’s ESXi Server,” in Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Parallel Processing,
ser. Euro-Par’11. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012, pp. 213–222. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29737-3 25
[5] Y. Xu, M. Bailey, F. Jahanian, K. Joshi, M. Hiltunen, and R. Schlichting, “An Exploration of L2
Cache Covert Channels in Virtualized Environments,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on
Cloud computing security workshop, ser. CCSW ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 29–40.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2046660.2046670
RR n° 8444
14 E. Caron and J. Rouzaud-Cornabas[6] K. Okamura and Y. Oyama, “Load-Based Covert Channels Between Xen Virtual Machines,” in
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, ser. SAC ’10. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 173–180. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1774088.1774125
[7] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, A. Oprea, and M. Reiter, “HomeAlone: Co-residency Detection in the Cloud
via Side-Channel Analysis,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, may 2011,
pp. 313 –328.
[8] Z. Wu, Z. Xu, and H. Wang, “Whispers in the Hyper-space: High-speed Covert Channel Attacks in
the Cloud,” in the 21st USENIX Security Symposium (Security’12), August 2012.
[9] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, T. Harris, A. Ho, R. Neugebauer, I. Pratt, and
A. Warfield, “Xen and the Art of Virtualization,” SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., vol. 37, no. 5, pp.
164–177, Oct. 2003. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1165389.945462
[10] V. Varadarajan, T. Kooburat, B. Farley, T. Ristenpart, and M. M. Swift, “Resource-Freeing
Attacks: Improve your Cloud Performance (At your Neighbor’s Expense),” in Proceedings of the
2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security, ser. CCS ’12. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 281–292. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382228
[11] T. Moscibroda and O. Mutlu, “Memory Performance Attacks: Denial of Memory Service in
Multi-Core Systems,” in Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security
Symposium, ser. SS’07. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2007, pp. 18:1–18:18. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1362903.1362921
[12] S. K. Barker and P. Shenoy, “Empirical Evaluation of Latency-Sensitive Application Performance
in the Cloud,” in Proceedings of the first annual ACM SIGMM conference on Multimedia
systems, ser. MMSys ’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 35–46. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1730836.1730842
[13] X. Pu, L. Liu, Y. Mei, S. Sivathanu, Y. Koh, and C. Pu, “Understanding Performance Interference
of I/O Workload in Virtualized Cloud Environments,” in Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2010 IEEE
3rd International Conference on, july 2010, pp. 51 –58.
[14] G. Wang and T. Ng, “The Impact of Virtualization on Network Performance of Amazon EC2 Data
Center,” in INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings IEEE, march 2010, pp. 1 –9.
[15] J. Schad, J. Dittrich, and J.-A. Quiane´-Ruiz, “Runtime Measurements in the Cloud: Observing,
Analyzing, and Reducing Variance,” Proc. VLDB Endow., vol. 3, no. 1-2, pp. 460–471, Sep. 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920841.1920902
[16] S. Bleikertz and T. Groß, “VALID: A Virtualization Assurance Language for Isolation and
Deployment,” IEEE Policy, 2011. [Online]. Available: http://openfoo.org/research/policy2011.pdf
[17] H. Raj, R. Nathuji, and A. Singh, “Resource management for isolation enhanced cloud
services,” CCSW ’09 Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security,
p. 77, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1655008.1655019http:
//portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1655019
[18] K. Taesoo, M. Peinado, and G. Mainar-Ruiz, “System-Level Protection Against Cache-based Side
Channel Attacks in the Cloud,” in Proceedings of the 21st Usenix Security Symposium, ser. USENIX
Security’12. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2012, pp. 1–16.
[19] A. Gulati, A. Merchant, and P. J. Varman, “mClock: Handling Throughput Variability for
Hypervisor IO Scheduling,” in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems
design and implementation, ser. OSDI’10. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2010, pp.
1–7. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1924943.1924974
[20] B. Verghese, A. Gupta, and M. Rosenblum, “Performance Isolation: Sharing and Isolation in
Shared-Memory Multiprocessors,” SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 181–192, Oct. 1998.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/384265.291044
Inria
Ame´liorer l’isolation des utilisateurs sur les IaaS: Placement de Machine Virtuelle avec contrainte de se´curite´15[21] A. Shieh, S. Kandula, A. Greenberg, and C. Kim, “Seawall: Performance Isolation for Cloud
Datacenter Networks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on Hot topics in cloud
computing, ser. HotCloud’10. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2010, pp. 1–1. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1863103.1863104
[22] E. Keller, J. Szefer, J. Rexford, and R. B. Lee, “NoHype: Virtualized Cloud Infrastructure without
the Virtualization,” SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 350–361, Jun. 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1816038.1816010
[23] J. Szefer, E. Keller, and R. Lee, “Eliminating the Hypervisor Attack Surface for a More Secure
Cloud,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://www.changetheassumptions.com/docs/ekeller nohype ccs11.pdf
[24] H. Nguyen Van, F. Dang Tran, and J.-M. Menaud, “Autonomic Virtual Resource Management for
Service Hosting Platforms,” in Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering
Challenges of Cloud Computing, ser. CLOUD ’09. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer
Society, 2009, pp. 1–8. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CLOUD.2009.5071526
[25] E. Feller, L. Rilling, C. Morin, R. Lottiaux, and D. Leprince, “Snooze: A Scalable, Fault-Tolerant
and Distributed Consolidation Manager for Large-Scale Clusters,” in Green Computing and Com-
munications (GreenCom), 2010 IEEE/ACM Int’l Conference on Int’l Conference on Cyber, Physical
and Social Computing (CPSCom), dec. 2010, pp. 125 –132.
[26] E. Feller, L. Rilling, and C. Morin, “Energy-Aware Ant Colony Based Workload Placement in
Clouds,” in The 12th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing (GRID-2011),
Lyon, France, Sep. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00626042/en/
[27] J. L. L. Simarro, R. Moreno-Vozmediano, R. S. Montero, and I. M. Llorente, “Dynamic Placement
of Virtual Machines for Cost Optimization in Multi-Cloud Environments,” in High Performance
Computing and Simulation (HPCS), 2011 International Conference on, july 2011, pp. 1 –7.
[28] J. Tordsson, R. S. Montero, R. Moreno-Vozmediano, and I. M. Llorente, “Cloud Brokering
Mechanisms for Optimized Placement of Virtual Machines Across Multiple Providers,” Future
Generation Computer Systems, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 358 – 367, 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X11001373
[29] D. Jayasinghe, C. Pu, T. Eilam, M. Steinder, I. Whally, and E. Snible, “Improving Performance and
Availability of Services Hosted on IaaS Clouds with Structural Constraint-aware Virtual Machine
Placement,” in Services Computing (SCC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2011,
pp. 72–79. [Online]. Available: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs all.jsp?arnumber=6009246
[30] M. Bhadauria and S. A. McKee, “An Approach to Resource-Aware Co-Scheduling for
CMPs,” in Proceedings of the 24th ACM International Conference on Supercomputing,
ser. ICS ’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 189–199. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1810085.1810113
[31] A. Merkel, J. Stoess, and F. Bellosa, “Resource-Conscious Scheduling for Energy Efficiency
on Multicore Processors,” in Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems,
ser. EuroSys ’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 153–166. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1755913.1755930
[32] S. Zhuravlev, S. Blagodurov, and A. Fedorova, “Addressing Shared Resource Contention in
Multicore Processors via Scheduling,” SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News, vol. 38, no. 1, pp.
129–142, Mar. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1735970.1736036
[33] J. Li, M. Qiu, J. Niu, W. Gao, Z. Zong, and X. Qin, “Feedback Dynamic Algorithms for
Preemptable Job Scheduling in Cloud Systems,” in Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM
International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 01, ser.
WI-IAT ’10. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2010, pp. 561–564. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WI-IAT.2010.30
RR n° 8444
16 E. Caron and J. Rouzaud-Cornabas[34] S. Srikantaiah, A. Kansal, and F. Zhao, “Energy Aware Consolidation for Cloud Computing,”
in Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Power aware computing and systems, ser.
HotPower’08. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2008, pp. 10–10. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1855610.1855620
[35] C. Klein and C. Perez, “An RMS for Non-predictably Evolving Applications,” Cluster Computing,
IEEE International Conference on, vol. 0, pp. 326–334, 2011.
[36] A. Lefray, E. Caron, J. Rouzaud-Cornabas, Z. Huaxi Yulin, A. Bousquet, J. Briffaut, and
C. Toinard, “Security-Aware Models for Clouds,” Jun. 2013, aCM Symposium on High-Performance
Parallel and Distributed Computing. [Online]. Available: http://hal.inria.fr/hal-00840734
Inria
RESEARCH CENTRE
GRENOBLE – RHÔNE-ALPES
Inovallée
655 avenue de l’Europe Montbonnot
38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
